Tort reform.

The problem with the British system--whereby the losing party pays the attorneys' fees of both parties--is that it discourages plaintiffs with fairly solid claims that happen to be a bit light in terms of damage awards. Which has the effect of denying access to the courts for the impoverished in many circumstances. Which is bad, methinks.

So what's the solution? The status quo arguably does not sufficiently discourage frivolous claims. So how about a compromise: what if we adopt a system where a losing plaintiff must pay his own legal bills and the legal bills of the defendants, but capped at the amount he pays to his own attorneys. So if a plaintiff pays his own attorneys $3000, the defendant pays his attorney $8000, the losing plaintiff ends up paying $6000 and the winning defendant pays $5000. It prevents monstrous defense bills from excessively impacting little-guy plaintiffs, but at the same time does discourage taking wild chances by initiating lawsuits.